Iran Arms Agreement

6 June 2006: China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States (the P5-1 refer to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) propose to Iran a framework agreement encouraging Iran to indefinitely suspend its enrichment programme. To allay fears, Iran could create and operate a secret enrichment facility similar to that of Natanz or Fordow, the agreement allows inspections of the entire fuel cycle; for up to 25 years in some establishments. This allows IAEA inspectors to inspect Iranian uranium stockpiles from mining through waste disposal and monitor all centrifuge production facilities. [107] John Kirby, State Department spokesman, replied, „There are no secret agreements between Iran and the IAEA that the P5-1 has not been informed of in detail“ and said, „This type of technical agreement with the IAEA is a matter of standard practice, whether not made public or published in other states, but our experts are familiar and familiar with the content. we would like to talk to Congress in a secret setting. [289] The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation wrote: „The agreement sets out procedural information on how the IAEA will conduct its investigation into the history of Iran`s laminated nuclear program, including the mention of the names of the informants who will be interviewed. Disclosure of this information would compromise these informants and the information it contains. [287] Mark Hibbs of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Thomas Shea, a former IAEA security officer and former head of defence non-proliferation programs at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, wrote that the accusations of „secret haircut“ by opponents of the agreement were an „established controversy.“ [89] Hibbs and Shea wrote: „The IAEA has a security agreement with 180 countries. All have similar information protection provisions. Without this, governments would not open their nuclear programs to multilateral surveillance. On 5 August, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano negotiated the book when he told members of Congress that he could not provide them with the details of the [verification protocol] negotiated by the IAEA with Iran as part of a bilateral „roadmap“.

[89] David Albright, founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security and former IAEA nuclear inspector, said calls for more transparency regarding the Iran-IAEA agreement were „not inappropriate“ and that „Iran is a great cry for more confidentiality. However, if the IAEA wanted to make it more open, it could do so. [293] Albright also proposed that the United States „clearly and publicly confirm, and Congress should argue through legislation that if Iran does not address the IAEA`s concerns about the previous military dimensions of its nuclear programs, the United States.